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Abstract— Graph knowledge models and ontologies are very powerful modeling and re asoning tools. We propose an 
effective approach to model network attacks and attack prediction which plays important roles in security 
management. The goals of this study are: First we model network attacks, their prerequisites and consequences using 
knowledge representation methods in order to provide description logic reasoning and inference over attack domain 
concepts. And secondly, we propose an ontology-based system which predicts potential attacks using inference and 
observing information which provided by sensory inputs. We generate our ontology and evaluate corresponding 
methods using CAPEC, CWE, and CVE hierarchical datasets. Results from experiments show significant capability 
improvements comparing to traditional hierarchical and relational models . Proposed method also reduces false 
alarms and improves intrusion detection effectiveness. 
Keywords- Knowledge Engineering, Network Security, Ontology. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Knowledge representation is an important 
technique in the context of the security management, 
since it provides a mechanism via which 
heterogeneous systems can interact with each other 
using same semantic, but different syntax. It also 
provides machines with powerful semantic–level 
capabilities such as logical inference without any 
complex prerequisite. 
In knowledge engineering, graph models are 
powerful data storages, which represent more concrete 
knowledge of a domain comparing to relational 
databases and hierarchical taxonomies. Ontology is a 
graph model represents knowledge of a domain by 
which developers and machines can share information 
in the domain. Ontologies mainly include concepts in 
the domain and relations among the concepts. It is a 
standard method to share common understanding of 
domain among experts, reuse domain knowledge, 
make assumptions explicit, separate domain 
knowledge from operational knowledge, and finally 
analyze domain of interest knowledge by means of 
logic. 
Despite various classifications and categorizations 
of network attacks, there is still no agreement on their 
structure and formal nature. To make some progress 
towards a shared conceptualizat ion of network attacks, 
and using this conceptualization as a method to predict 
potential attacks, this paper presents a general models 
of network attacks, and describes a method by which 
potential attacks can be predicted using inference over 
the network attacks model (which is a semantic 
representation of data received from input intrusion 
detection sensors). From representation perspective. 
we focus on how an ontology and corresponding 
knowledge base could be constructed from informal 
and semi-informal data sources; and from problem 
solving perspective of ontologies, we use formal 
definitions to predict possible attacks in a system or a 
network. Pred icting a network attack prior to the 
actual incident helps to resolve vulnerabilit ies, update 
system configurations and fix weaknesses, prevent 
consequences like data, and last but not least prevent 
potential attacks to happen based on our knowledge of 
the current state. 
Our contribution is to not only transform 
information about network attacks from being 
machine-readable to machine-understandable, but also 
use produced knowledge to predict potential attacks 
according to the vulnerabilit ies, weaknesses, and 
prerequisites of an attack. Moreover proposed 
ontology can be used as a common vocabulary and 
semantic representation of attacks for agents in the 
network (e.g. IDSs), by which machines can 
communicate. 
While our concern is to design an ontology and 
more importantly to use the ontology as a base for 
further reasoning techniques, it’s desired to have a 
consistent, extendable, and coherent ontology. Section 
VI explores some evaluation techniques to check these 
criteria. Figure 1 illustrates overall architecture of 
proposed system. For the purpose of standardizing 
logs and event, CEE dataset [25] (a unified event 
classification by combining support for multiple event 
syntaxes and log protocols) is used. 
We first provide a brief review of researches about 
network attack definitions, followed by the definition 
of ontology as a model for semantics in this domain. 
Section IV describes a methodology by which a 
powerful and descriptive ontology on network attack 
can be constructed by using some semi-informal 
sources. In section V we propose a method to predict 
possible scenarios in which a network attack could 
happen. These scenarios are direct results of machine 
inferences over underlying ontology constructed in the 
previous step. Outputs of such description logic 
inferences could be weaknesses, vulnerabilities and 
potential attack patterns that have to be taken care of. 
We conclude in Section VII. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In this section, we first provide a review of current 
researches of representing and predicting network 
attacks, including their limitations. And second part of 
this section briefly  describes ontologies and our 
desired properties of an ontology for the task of 
network attack prediction. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Formal defin ition of network attacks is mostly 
limited to taxonomies and attack languages. 
Ontological modeling of attacks is a new category of 
research which has few published research papers in 
the literature. Reference [29] introduces an ontology 
for knowledge representation goal, and its applications 
for information security are investigated. References 
[23] and [30] also provide modeling for intrusion 
detection, and a limited ontology of well-known 
attacks is introduced.  
The majority of existing resources in the area of 
prediction and ontological modeling of network 
attacks are limited to biology and prediction in the 
domain of genes, biological entities. Below is an 
exp loration on taxonomies, attack languages, and 
overall idea of prediction. 
Various hierarchical data modeling and different 
taxonomies proposed for network attacks lead to a 
very large group of variant syntax representation of 
network attacks. OSBVDB [1] and Capec [5] both 
present taxonomies classified from the view of 
attacked entity. Moreover, reference [17] represents 
another taxonomy, in which attacks are classified 
based on how, when, and where they happen. We 
incorporated attacked entity’s view into our ontology. 
In addition to attack categorizations, vulnerabilit ies 
and weaknesses are also categorized with regard to 
their relation to the attacks, respectively, in CVE [7] 
and CWE [20]. These two concepts (vulnerability and 
weakness) are also incorporated into our ontology for 
prediction purposes. In addition to these main 
concepts, [14][16][19] review consequences of 
attacks. According to [26], consequences are divided 
into "(Unauthorized) Disclosure", "Deception", 
"Disruption", and "Usurpation" categories. These 
categories are also imported into our ontology for the 
reporting purposes of prediction, which is beyond 
focus of this paper. In another view of attacks, since 
IDSs are either adjacent to or co–located with attack 
targets, taxonomies are usually from attack target 
entities’ view. We use this idea to model attack–
related concepts, and predict attacks based on sensed 
logs and events. Additionally weaknesses, 
consequences, vulnerabilities, and other means of 
attacks are observed in [4], which are consistent with 
our ontology. On the contrary, [3] and [21] suggest 
modeling attack behavior from attacker’s view in a 
taxonomical order. Reference [3] also states that attack 
detection is a young area of research, yet need more 
study to build an accepted framework. According to 
this statement, since ontologies work on semantic level 
rather than syntax level, developing an ontology for 
attack, inspired by the prediction task seems 
reasonable. As an outcome, ontologies can be used on 
growing taxonomy or attack language–based 
intrusion–related heterogeneous IDSs which use same 
concepts and yet different syntax as a common 
vocabulary. 
Although taxonomies provide more information 
than simple list of concepts, they lack more 
interrelations between concepts and formal inferences. 
However, our proposed ontology is constructed upon 
existing attack taxonomy known as Capec, 
vulnerability taxonomy called CVE, and weakness 
taxonomy called CWE, all provided by Mitre. Our 
main contributions to the current state of these 
modeling and attack research domain are to discover 
inter–relationships and employ semantic–based 
methods to explore more intelligent techniques in the 
domain of discourse.  
Taxonomies are not the only way to model 
network attacks. There are also attack languages in 
literature, classified as event reporting, correlation and 
recognition languages [10][11]. Compared to their 
possible features, ontologies are capable of 
simultaneously function similar to what reporting, 
correlating, and recognizing languages do. 
Among various attack languages [18][13][22][24], 
STATL [10][11] is a finite–state machine based attack 
detection language, designed to describe an attack as a 
sequence of required actions or steps that need to be 
performed  prior to the attack. Although STATL is an 
attacker–centric representation, we used such an attack 
pattern to describe mult i–steps attacks in the attack 
prediction module (from IDSs’ perspective) using 
semantic rules (using SWRL). STATL has some 
downsides like its lack of features to define larger 
attacks by merging minor attacks, vulnerabilit ies, and 
weaknesses. 
CIDF [6] was also introduces in an effort to define 
protocols and interfaces to share attack information 
between researchers. The standard format of 
generalized intrusion detection object, which is core 
object to CIDF to exchange attack–related data, is 
defined in CIDL (Common Intrusion Detection 
Language) [12] which is capable of defining reports on 
the events. 
The most active exchange format in the domain of 
network attack is IDMEF [8][31]. IDMEF uses XML 
to exchange data. IDMEF is an effort to establish a 
data model which defines computer intrusions. It 
defines a data model that represents data produced by 
an IDS. This data format is used in our system 
architecture to receive logs and events generated by 
IDSs, and then convert those sensed data into triples 
that are ready to be asserted into the knowledge base. 
Modeling attack aside, detecting or predicting 
attack patterns are both desired goals for security 
managers. To predict or detect attack plans various 
statistical, probabilistic [33], analytical [34], and 
machine learning techniques like SVM [37][39], 
neural networks [39], and Genetic Algorithm [37] 
have been introduces [34]. In [36] active support 
vector domain description algorithm could find over 
95% of predefined attacks. In general, machine 
learning methods lack invariant modeling for different 
representations of a same attack, and convergence 
problem (mostly in  weak search algorithms like 
evolutionary techniques). They are also subjected to 
lack of extendibility for new attacks, vulnerabilities, 
and weaknesses. In addition, those methods suffer 
from too much parameters and process -consuming 
phase of optimization prior to be applicable to attack 
prediction or detection. 
Comparing to the current recognition techniques, 
formal representation of attacks not only helps us to 
use common and straightforward logic and formal 
models instead of variant representations, but also by 
increasing efficiency which caused by too much 
parameters  (system parameters which are used for 
anomaly analysis), provides faster response to security 
problems. Unlike machine learning algorithms, logical 
reasoning algorithms like forward-chaining and 
backward chaining seem sufficient. This leads to 
simple yet powerful solution. By introducing new 
concepts, their relations, and logical rules, formal 
knowledge makes it  possible to resolve slow 
improvements in parameter optimization, and time-
consuming training phase. Additionally, due to 
common representations of attacks for various tasks 
(e.g. prediction, detection, and reporting), ontological 
representation of computer attacks can be extended to 
new applications. References [35] and [38] present 
more in-depth reviews of various intrusion and 
anomaly detection techniques. 
THEORY 
Ontology is a key technique that gives the 
capability of annotating semantics, and provides a 
common and straightforward infrastructure for formal 
definition of resources on the domain of concern [40]. 
Ontologies are described by a 5–tuple 
 (C, H
C
, R, H
R
, I), (1) 
Where C represents a set of classes or concepts, 
and is sorted by a hierarchy defined by H
C
, and R 
represents a set of relations between two classes, 
where Ri R, and Ri→C×C. H
C
 and H
R
 depict 
hierarchies of concepts and relations respectively [9]. 
Finally I represents individuals of classes (C) or 
relations (R). 
Our desired target of expressivity is SHOIN(D)
1
, and 
we have used OWL–DL as the underlying storage 
language. Expressivity level of SHIOIQ
2
 is slightly 
more expressive description logic than SHOIN(D), the 
description logic underlying OWL–DL [32]. Unlike, 
OWL–Lite, OW L–DL has the capability to reason and 
infer over knowledge bases. Also unlike OWL–Full, 
reasoning using description logic over OWL–DL is a 
decidable problem. 
III. NETWORK ATTACK ONTOLOGY 
In this section, we describe the methods that have 
is applied to generate ontological representation from 
sources like Capec, CW E, and CVE, processes take 
place to do inference over that ontology, and internal 
structures which make all these happen from sensory 
inputs to the prediction results. 
In the following sections we describe different 
pathways to generate final ontology based on two 
different basic kernel ontologies. At the end, we merge 
those two domain–level ontologies and use a single 
knowledge base as an input to the prediction phase. To 
avoid redundancy, we used unique identifier provided 
by Capec, CWE, and CVE. In addition, a lexical 
ontology is provided to translate concepts of these two 
ontologies to each other. 
                                                                 
1  SHOIN(D) means ontology includes attributive language, 
complex concept negation, transitive property, role hierarchy, 
nominals , inverse property, cardinality restriction, and uses 
datatypes. 
2  SHIOIQ is capable of using qualified cardinality 
restrictions in addition to SHOIN(D) features. 
Figure 1. General Architecture of Proposed System for Attack Detection  
 
To provide a basic structure for the growing 
knowledge base of target system, a translator has been 
designed, which takes some standard attack 
taxonomies as inputs, extract semantic structures, and 
gives multiple ontologies as outputs. The translator is 
actually a rule–based parser that extracts concepts and 
structures from taxonomies. It also checks multip le 
taxonomies for well-matched mutual relat ions of their 
concepts (e.g. relations between a single attack pattern 
from Capec taxonomy and multiple vulnerabilit ies 
from CVE taxonomy). The output directed graph is 
then used as a base point for the knowledge bas e of 
attacks where individuals are imported into the 
knowledge base according to the system events and 
packet logs. Beside the generated ontologies, higher 
level domain ontology to complete those events and 
logs has been designed by hand, so concepts like IP 
address, ports, and other related system entities will be 
covered during inference process. In the following 
sections structures of those ontologies and architecture 
of the translator will be described in detail. 
The first method to generate an ontology and apply 
prediction methods over it is to model the domain of 
network attacks by splitting concepts according to 
their semantics. To split semantically, a basic core 
ontology consisting of basic attack concepts has been 
provided. In this method we extend this ontology 
based on extracted concepts and relations from semi-
informal sources like Capec, CW E, CVE, and OSVDB 
taxonomies. 
Three basic classes have been adopted for describing 
attack domain concepts, 1) Attack Patterns that define 
the properties of a single attack, 2) Weaknesses which 
define all weaknesses causing attacks to happen at the 
first place, and 3) Vulnerabilities. 
A. Complement Domain Ontology 
In addition to each attack’s properties and relations 
to vulnerabilities and weaknesses, there are 
complement concepts which is necessary for 
knowledge base to model the domain of network 
attacks properly. These concepts are more related to 
the system domain and how we model network attacks 
in general. Fig. 2 shows some parts of the ontology 
including those complement concepts used for data 
leakage attacks. Natural language descriptions of each 
attack in Capec, CVE, and CW E are the sources of 
such a structure for each attack pattern. 
To keep track of attack steps and system 
properties, final ontology includes a storage unit to 
store time, data and other properties of a multi–phase 
attack. Figure x illustrates overall architecture of 
proposed system for predicting network attacks. 
B. Linking Data Sources and Knowledge Bases 
Two methods have been applied to generate 
ontology from information and data sources. The first 
method employ rule -based automatic translation to 
convert data sources like Capec to a mid-level 
representation, and then automatically generate an 
ontology by extending a core ontology, and the other 
method is to create and manage an ontology by 
extending a core ontology manually. 
Outputs of both methods are then checked for its 
consistency and removing conflicts. 
C. High-level Attack Patterns 
Each attack has three essential parts, the 
prerequisites which includes necessary weaknesses 
and vulnerabilities, the process which describes all the 
steps have to be taken to complete the attack and 
consequence which describes result of the attack.  
D. Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities 
Weaknesses and vulnerabilities have been 
extracted automatically from some standard human 
reviewed data sources such as CWE and CVE. For 
each weakness in CWE, a class representing that 
weakness is created. The hierarchy of weakness 
ontology (H
C
) is based on the structure of CWE 
dataset. Each weakness has a property which points to 
the related attack. Another ontology is also created by 
using the same method for vulnerabilities. Both 
generated ontologies then are merged into the attack 
ontology. To avoid duplicated entities during replacing 
common properties with a real class or individual 
names, unique identifiers were used while generating 
each ontology from source datasets. 
E. Intermediate Graph Model 
Before converting our ontology to a standard 
language like OW L/RDF, an intermediate model is 
generated. This model is a bid irectional graph, where 
each node represents a concept, and each edge 
represents a relation between two concepts.  
 
Figure 2. Complement ontology for data leakage attacks 
 
IV. PREDICTION VIA REASONING 
Two different approaches  have been employed to 
detect possible pathways to a network attack. First we 
use reasoning techniques over an ontology to detect 
potential attack patterns, and then send the results to a 
simulation system, to update an internal state, and list 
possible pathways which can lead to an intrusion. 
Parser checks if a  mapping exists between two entities 
Ei and Ej respectively, then it adds the equivalent 
relation to the intermediate graph model. 
When the ontologies are imported into the 
knowledge base, several rules are generated by 
inference from the chain of implications. From this 
point the knowledge base is ready to receive instances 
of concepts of the ontologies. These instances are 
imported into the knowledge base through OWL/RDF 
triple syntax. Triple syntax of an instance is in the 
form of {SUBJECT; PREDICATE; OBJECT}. To 
query the knowledge base same syntax is used, where 
subject is a class, predicate is a relation, and object is 
either a class or a literal. The difference between these 
two sentences is that in query syntax at most two of 
three fragments have to be defined as variable by a "?" 
symbol. If there are some facts in knowledge base, or 
derived facts resulting from the inference process that 
match the query pattern, the values of those triples will 
be provided as the output of reasoning over the 
knowledge base. Fig. 4 depicts process of feeding data 
into the knowledge base, and reasoning against 
collected triples in the knowledge base. 
Because of ontological notion of OWL language 
which is used to represent the knowledge base, 
different levels of granularity to query the knowledge 
base are possible. Generated ontologies provide 
various types of query with varying levels of 
granularity. The following queries depict three 
different levels to look up the knowledge based for the 
existence of a specific attack, all attacks of a specific 
type, and instances of an attack which has been caused 
by a specific weakness. Due to the use of SPARQL 
language for query interface, more complex types of 
queries are also possible, which is beyond the goals of 
this paper. 
To provide a solid backbone to define rules for 
attack patterns, four main query types have been 
implemented: 1) Query for a specific attack, which 
returns possible individual triples on a specific 
network node for a specific attack type, including 
additional individuals required to describe an attack 
(e.g. attack steps), 2) Query for attacks of a specific 
attack type, which returns those individual triples 
defining attack patterns on all nodes in the network 
which are related to a specific attack (this type of 
queries helps to identify attacks that are distributed 
and take place in mult iple nodes, e.g. Mitnick attack), 
3) Query for all attacks caused by a specific weakness, 
to provide the reasoner with possible attacks caused by 
a discovered weakness class or individual (as a result, 
admin istrators can decide about the priority of 
resolving a weakness based on the possibility of 
potential attacks), and 4) Query for attacks caused by a 
specific vulnerability class or individual. 
The prediction phase employs reasoning 
techniques and iterate over all returned triples to detect 
potential attacks. In this phase a query based on 
observed events, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and 
attacks is generated by the system in SPARQL format. 
Then results from knowledge base are gathered and 
grouped based on their similarit ies. The final step of 
prediction is matching those triples with current 
system state, and returning those triples which are 
mostly appropriate to happen based on the current 
network state. The aim of this multi–phase technique 
is to firstly overcome shortage of the ontology to keep 
track of dynamic parameters of events (e.g time) 
which are important in mult i–step attacks, and 
secondly simplify queries. 
The main idea behind prediction is to utilize a set 
of Semantic Rule Language (SWRL) rules that 
represent vulnerabilities, weakness and other 
prerequisites of each attack in a single place. 
 
Figure 3. Architecture of feeding observed data into the knowledge base 
 
Formula 2 illustrates how a network node (?s) is 
marked as Vulnerable, and formula 3 represents 
overall pattern of attack detection formula. 
Predictability can be achieved by changing s (logical 
ANDs) of vulnerabilities to s (logical ORs) of them 
in formula 3. Formula 4 depicts such prediction rule.  
V. EVALUATION OF PRODUCED ONTOLOGY 
To evaluate and test our ontologies, we applied 
three different approaches. We gave our ontologies to 
three different human experts in network attack 
domain to evaluate the quality of the ontologies. Then 
various quantity parameters have been extracted for 
quantitative evaluation. And finally we asserted them 
into the knowledge base and ran queries against the 
knowledge base. In the second phase of evaluation 
some predefined events have been asserted into the 
knowledge base, which are prerequisites of multip le 
attacks, so test prediction unit could be tested by 
predicting those desired attacks. 
 
Formulas 2,3, and 4. Main Prediction Rules Based on Vulnerabilities 
 
 
A. Quantitative Evaluation 
To evaluate and describe certain aspects of 
designed ontology, several metrics have to be 
extracted from ontology and knowledge based 
structures. These metrics provide comparability 
between two versions of the same ontology during the 
ontology’s lifecycle, make it possible to compare and 
evaluate changes in the domain described by the 
ontology. Unlike qualitative parameters, the metrics 
described in this section cannot be used to evaluate if 
an ontology is good or bad, but they can be used to 
track changes in quantitative characteristics such as 
richness over the ontology’s lifecycle. Since 
ontologies are usually designed with their planned 
applications in mind, they have different 
characteristics from each other. As a result of these 
different approaches of ontology design, those 
ontologies that are aimed for the same task are 
comparable with each other. 
Quantitative metrics are divided into two groups: 
those related to ontology, and those related to 
knowledge base (ontology and individuals). The first 
group evaluates design and potential of the ontology in 
representing desired knowledge, and the second group 
evaluates effective utilization of the ontology to model 
individuals of the domain. Fo llowing a description of 
both groups is presented. These quantitative 
parameters can be used to improve certain aspects of 
designed knowledge representation of the domain. As 
an example of this kind of improvement, one can 
improve the ontology’s capability to model each single 
attack’s properties, or track attack categorization 
changes during knowledge based lifecycle. 
Ontology Metrics : These metrics indicate 
richness, width, depth, and hierarchical level of an 
ontology design [27]. The most important metrics of 
this group are: 
1) Object Properties Richness, which reflects the 
diversity of non–inheritance relationships, and is 
represented as the number of objects and data 
properties between classes compared to all possible 
relations (including hierarchical relationships like  
is-a). 
2) Inheritance Richness, is defined as the average 
number of subclasses per class. 
3) Data Properties Richness, is defined as the 
average number of functional object properties in 
addition to data properties per class. 
Knowledge Base Metrics : Beside these design 
related metrics of ontologies, it’s important to measure 
how the ontology is utilized to model real world 
individuals such as attacks. Knowledge base metrics 
describe the quality of an ontology to assign class or 
properties to the individuals and cover concepts of the 
domain. Below is the list of knowledge based metrics: 
4) Class Richness, describes how instances are 
distributed across classes. This is defined as the 
number of non–empty classes (those with at least one 
individual), div ided by the total number of classes 
defined in the ontology. 
5) Class Connectivity, gives an indication of what 
classes are important in the ontology, based on the 
relationships between individuals of all classes (known 
as individual graph or knowledge base graph). This 
metric is defined as the number of object properties 
between individuals of a class, and individuals belong 
to other classes. 
6) Class Importance, is calculated by number of 
individuals belong to classes at the inheritance sub tree 
rooted at the chosen class, divided by the total number 
of individuals. 
7) Individual Graph Components, shows how 
individuals are related to each other, and defined as the 
number of connected components of the knowledge 
base graph. 
8) Object Properties Richness, reflects how much 
of object properties for a class in the ontology are 
actually used at the individuals level. Th is metric is 
defined as the number of object properties that are 
being used by individual Ii of class Ci , compared to 
the number of all object properties that are defined for 
Ci at the ontology level. 
[28] and [15] list even more metrics that evaluate 
various aspects of ontologies, and knowledge bases, 
which are beyond scope of this paper. 
In addition to these metrics, the generated 
ontologies have been evaluated using the following 
metrics: 
 Quantity of class nominated, 
  medium of properties (Po), 
  is-a object property level of the ontology, 
  class bigger rank of the is-a object property, 
and 
  class bigger rank of all-part object property. 
Table 1 lists various quantitative metric parameters 
of produced attack ontology. 
VI. EVALUATE INFERENCE (USE CASE) 
In this section a use case for evaluating prediction 
rules (aside from graph structure of ontology) is 
exp lored. To evaluate reasoning capability of 
produced ontology (including attack prediction rules) 
and knowledge base, we initiated some attacks on 
network nodes by simulating logs and events for each. 
Triples representing simulated logs and events then 
asserted into the knowledge base. Figure 4 shows the 
rule is used to mark a system as vulnerable, for a data 
leakage attack so–called JavaScript Hijacking or 
JSON Hijacking attack with Capec ID of 111. Capec 
describes this attack as "An attacker targets a system 
that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a 
transport mechanism between the client and the server 
(common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal 
possibly confidential information transmitted from the 
server back to the client inside the JSON object by 
taking advantage of the loophole in the browser’s 
Single Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript 
from one website to be included and executed in the 
context of another website" [2]. These rules and those 
simulated logs and events asserted into the knowledge 
base. Then by querying subclasses of 
UnderPotentialAttackSystem, it could be seen 
simulated system node is among them (as an under 
attack node). 
As it can be seen, even simple attacks need 
multiple independent long rules. Unlike traditional 
methods like taxonomies or attack languages, the 
overall technique of using ontology and SWRL (which 
tends to store rules as concepts and properties in OW L 
format rather than different format) makes them 
maintainable and easy to update for new attacks. 
As a use case scenario for testing mult i–phase 
attacks, Mitnick attack set of rules asserted into the 
knowledge base and system nodes tested on it. As a 
result of feeding logs and events of simulated Mitnick 
attack, in all steps of this attack the prediction system 
predicted it successfully by marking respective nodes 
as Vulnerable and UnderPotentialAttackSystem. 
 
 
Table 1. Quantitative Evaluation Metrics For Attack Domain Ontolog 
 
 
 
Figure 4. JavaScript hijacking attack (CAPEC–111) prediction rules 
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
These results demonstrate that the ontology-driven 
prediction methods are a promising approach for the 
network attack domain. Since network attacks are 
mostly described in detail by various semi-informal 
datasets, the following future researches are possible 
in the field of network attacks: ontology-driven 
intercommunication between heterogeneous intrusion 
detection agents with different languages and models, 
knowledge-based intelligent intrusion detection, and 
interdisciplinary methods to predict and prevent 
network attacks by merging multiple knowledge bases 
from different domains as well as detect and resolve 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities of a network node by 
reasoning over past attacks’ information. 
Due to the generalized conceptualization of produced 
ontology, its applications can be extended to other 
attack-related problems including, but not limited to 
attack report unificat ion, correlation, and recognition. 
For these kinds of applications more detailed attacks, 
vulnerabilities, and weaknesses can be imported into 
the further ontology. To improve richness of the 
ontology, informal knowledge in natural language 
sources could be extracted from various informal 
sources using natural language processing techniques. 
Prediction technique presented in this paper can be 
extended to consider more parameters (e.g. various 
network behaviors and anomalies). In addit ion, since 
forward-chaining reasoning is much faster for small 
set of axioms, proposed logic-base technique can be 
extended to employ machine learning classification 
techniques to reduce axioms used as bas e for 
inference. 
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